From bad to worse

Tragic news out of Somalia:

" A suicide bombing in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, left at least 32 people dead. Six of the victims were members or the embattled Somali parliament, and the government blamed the Al Qaeda-linked insurgent group, Al Shabab." -CSM

Just when it looked like things couldn't get worse in Somalia, they did. What will be the fallout of this deadly bombing is yet unclear, but what is clear is that things cannot continue on the current course. From the vantage point of residents of Mogadishu, the city is under siege. No progress has been made on minimizing the threat of Al-Shabab, or in creating a legitimate central government. The current strategy of the TFG and its outside allies must change.

At this point what is essential is a Somali-led process, one that is not interfered in (visibly) by outside actors/governments. Propping up "friendly" governments has not been a successful strategy, probably because, as it turns out, governments need at least a minimum threshold of popular support before they can function effectively. And the only way to defeat Al-Shabab is to provide a better option for the public, not a better option for foreign governments.

I'm nevertheless confident that things will get better in Somalia very soon. And so, as Somalis look for a relatively popular government to fill the current leadership vacuum, I'm hoping the international community will learn from the mistakes of the past and avoid backing unpopular leaders that prove unable to govern, but rather, take a step back and let Somalis resolve this issue internally.

AID

There is a lot of debate lately on the effectiveness of foreign aid. There are extremes in this debate, both of which make sense to a degree, which tells me that the answer is somewhere in the middle. There is the Jeffrey Sachs school that says aid is essential to lifting countries and populations out of poverty because it saves lives and fosters growth. And there is the increasingly popular view of Dambisa Moyo, that says that aid is detrimental to countries because it isn't sustainable and leads to unaccountable governance.

Two of my favorite economists seem to think aid is not desirable for development: Paul Colliers and William Easterly. The more I read about the issue, the more I think that the effectiveness of aid depends primarily on the quality of the government and institutions. Whether a nation can take aid money and make good use of it, or whether politicians pocket it and/or use it to consolidate their rule, depends on the leaders themselves. In places like Rwanda, the government is able to take advantage of foreign aid to develop infrastructure and strengthen institutions. This can be seen as a success story, howeveer, the government of Paul Kagame has recently been accused of attacking his opposition, and perhaps aid has made this targeting more possible.

Aid may be an enemy of democracy because it can so easily be used by governments to prop themselves up. But aid can also be a friend of democracy by enabling weak governments to carry out the sorts of reforms and development plans necessary to create strong governance. So ultimately, as long as aid is given to governments and organizations without their being held accountable for progress, the impact of aid will be weak and unclear at best.

Somalia's war as a bargaining failure needing a peace-broker

I firmly believe war is not the natural state of humans, but that war is a consequence of a bargaining failure between states or parties. In Somalia, there were many attempts at resolving the conflict before the 1990 civil war started but they all failed. Lack of understanding about the other side's capabilities, intent and capacity made it difficult for the clan leaders to agree on a settlement. After an agreement between the conflicting parties fell apart in 1992, the U.S. military entered Somalia, primarily to ensure aid convoys reached intended populations, but they also represented a guarantor for a new agreement in the eyes of Somali warlords. The next agreement reached outlasted all of the others because it had a credible commitment in the U.S. military presence.

When the U.S.’s UNITAF force withdrew and was replaced by the U.N.’s UNISOM II, the credibility of the force diminished (in the eyes of the warlords) because of the perceived weakness of the U.N. Further complicating matters, the U.N. adopted a strategy of siding with one warlord and targeting the other, leading to frequent firefights and the disastrous battle of Mogadishu.

A Credible Peace-broker

This example from recent history can be a valuable lesson as we think about whether a military force can be effective in Somalia today. The make-up of the force, as well as its mission on the ground, determine whether it can play the role of a guarantor of a peace agreement, or whether it will simply become a party to the conflict.

In 1992, the U.S. was the most credible guarantor of peace because of its military might and its neutrality among the warring factions. Today, however, the U.S. cannot play that role. The disastrous consequences following the Ethiopian occupation reveal that Ethiopia cannot play such a role. And it appears Uganda, too, can no longer play a neutral role now that it has been engaged in combat in Mogadishu for so long. 

The question many policymakers are wondering is who, if anyone, can play the role of peace broker in Somalia? That’s a difficult question to answer until there is more clarity about the ambitions of Al-Shabab, and whether they would see any party as an acceptable force. There needs to be a better grasp on how the objectives of the organization are shaped and change, and where the zone of possible agreement lies between the TFG and al-Shabab. Until then, we will continue to attempt to create resolutions that end in just another bargaining failure.

Economics of war

I spoke with an economics professor a while ago. He was completely unfamiliar with the situation in Somalia so I gave him a summary of what is going on. He then suggested I look into how economics can explain the continuation of conflict in Somalia. To sum up his idea, he stated that logically Somalia should be stable by now, and the fact that it is not suggest key stakeholders are benefiting from the instability. He described the struggle for power between the TFG, Shabaab and other entities as a struggle to provide economic goods to the population. The primary good they attempt to offer is security.

This analysis was very interesting, but I immediately thought of a weakness in the argument. If the parties are attempting to provide a good- primarily security- and the population is the consumer being targeted, then why doesn't the population have more of a role in the developments on the ground than they currently do? Similar to the power of consumers in determining the actions of producers through the laws of supply and demand. It seems more like the goods of each faction are forced on the population that falls within their sphere of influence, and some groups even do more to decrease security than increase it. The people, particularly in Mogadishu, have little power to determine which entity they live under.

I think the economic analysis is a very valuable one, particularly when considering why other nations and entities are involved in Somali affairs, but economics certainly cannot explain everything. The situation in Somalia cannot be assessed through one lens; economic, political or otherwise. It has very much to do with political leaders, businesses, ideas, historical experience, international developments and timing, among other things. The re-stabilization of Somalia will require a more beneficial confluence of these and other factors.

Recommendations for Peacekeeping missions

As nations become more interconnected and come into greater contact, conflicts are increasingly boiling over, from narco-terrorism to piracy, leading internal conflicts to spread instability to other nations and continents. Thus, preventing conflicts and maintaining stability- depending on the region- can be a hugely important role for multi-national organizations. The United Nations and other multinational organizations such as the AU have peacekeeping mechanisms, but face major challenges in exerting influence. Peacekeeping has proved unsuccessful in many cases, including Somalia, because of weaknesses in the peacekeeping operations, including the lack of clarity on when to intervene, how to intervene (strategy), and the difficulty in finding resources for missions. These challenges, I believe, can be alleviated through more operational efficiency; however, they cannot be completely eliminated because they are inherent to the nature of peacekeeping, given the nature of anarchic international politics and global governance structures.

 

Recommendations

• Peacekeepers should only go into a situation where there is a peace to keep
• A criteria should be developed to elaborate on how engagement should occur, based on consent and impartiality
• Nation building and peace enforcement should not be the function of multinational peacekeeping operations
• Mandates should be limited in scope and resourced appropriately
• The peacekeeping strategy used should be context specific, local knowledge is necessary
• A clear command and control structure should be established for contingents
•  Resources should be more effectively acquired through institutional re-structuring to increase the incentives to support missions
• Rapid peacekeeping troop deployment mechanisms should be established

Colliers on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

A friend of mine just told me about Ted.com, a brilliant website that has short video's done by leading intellectuals and leaders from all fields, talking about a valuable idea they wish to share with the world. I just listed to Paul Collier's video called "New Rules on Building Post-conflict Nations." I personally found it very valuable. Some of his ideas are not new but he did mention some novel ways of approaching post-conflict reconstruction.

http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/paul_collier_s_new_rules_for_rebuilding_a_broken_nation.html

Summary of Collier's Ideas on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

His main point is that post-conflict reconstruction approaches are usually based on political approaches, and this has proven to be a failed strategy. Forced political settlements, short-lived peacekeeping deployments and premature elections usually do not create stable, legitimate government. He argues that the game of politics must be changed from a zero-sum game to a positive-sum game, and this can be done by first creating security and then building prosperity.

He says three interdependent actors play key-role in post-conflict countries: the Security Council because they control peacekeeping troops, donors because they provide aid and assist in economic recovery and the post-conflict Government because it has the power to do economic reform and be politically inclusive.

These three actors are interdependent because if the Security Council doesn’t commit to recreating security, there won’t be the environment for investment to occur. Without policy reform and aid, economic recovery cannot happen. Collier called for a Compact of some sort to bring together the three actors to make mutual commitments.
He also identified three critical steps in post-conflict reconstruction:

Jobs

Young men especially need jobs to prevent militancy. Most governments expand civil service and have bloated bureaucracies because uncompetitive economics makes private sector expansion difficult. Collier recommends these governments focus on the construction sector because construction isn’t exposed to international trade and can generate jobs fast. The post-conflict government’s policy priority should be to break bottlenecks in the construction sector by enabling legal land acquisition, skill-building, and increasing firms.

Improvement in Services

This is important because populations must see the post-conflict government providing for them, and collaboration with NGOs is a wise way to provide these services. Government ministries can plan policies and distribute finances to NGOs that provide necessary services on. This will allow NGOs to compete with each other, and the government can put its name on services that reach the population.

Clean Government
The typical post-conflict government doesn’t have money even for basic requirements. If donors just put money in and leave, that money can easily be wasted or captured by corrupt politicians. Scrutiny and technical assistance should come with finances. On a broader not, politicians shouldn’t have much money otherwise the wrong type of people are attracted to the job.

Why Somalia is a failed state

I got an e-mail the other day advertising an event titled "Why States Fail." I immediately thought maybe, just maybe, this lecture could give me some insight on the case of Somalia. In the end, it actually did clarify a few things- sort of. It's expalantion was a theory based on political economies.

The lecturer was Daron Acemoglu from MIT. His thesis is that states fail when they do not have inclusive political and economic instititutions. Hence, to prevent states from failing, make sure these institutions are strong and inclusive, rather than extractive.

Inclusive institution allow for a more level playing field, rule of law and a broader coaltition of leaders, while extractive institutions have barriers to economic and political advancement for most of the population, except for the few that extract their money and power from the rest.

When a state has inclusive institutions, according to Acemoglu, a sufficient amount of the population has their interests met, and feel as though there is space for them in the current system to improve their condition, either financially or politically. Further, there is room for growth and development when institutions are inclusive because it enables the reallocation of benefits and creative destruction- changing those institutions or practices that are no longer moving the nation forward. When institutions are extractive, the amount of freedom to allow for creative destruction no longer exists, and nations are stagnant wherever the elite believe they can benefit and extract the most from the population. Inclusive institutions are therefore more favorable to growth and development.

How does this apply to Somalia?

Somalia, with its zero-sum political climate, certainly doesnt have inclusive political institutions. According to Acemoglu, however, nations that adopt inclusive economic institutions will more likely move in the direction of inclusive political instutions as more of the population is financially empowered. There are many factors that are invovled in this transition, and Acemoglu says a "lucky confluence of factors" must occur to enable nations to make such a transformative transition. I'd sure like to hear more about what that confluence entails.

Somalia has one of the worlds most open markets, and is therefore largely economically inclusive. The problem, however, is that there is insufficient rule of law and property rights that would enable more effective economic institutions and growth. Nevertheless, this research suggests that if the transitional Somali government increases the robustness of the already largely inclusive economic institutions, then the inclusive political instutions will more likely follow.

I'm not sure of the predictive power of this theory, but it certainly is a strategy the Somali government should look into as a means of stabilizing the country and enabling development in the long-term.