A uniquely Somali love story - Part 1

The life stories of Somali refugees are the most complicated, tragic, but hopeful stories you'll ever come across. I've heard Somalis describe just about every route possible in their journey to the U.S., and the risk and ingenuity involved is astounding. I've never come across a Somali family that didn't have stops in at least one or two countries, some stopping in as many as four or five nations, before reaching their destination in the U.S. or elsewhere.

But today I heard a story unlike the others in that it was one that had a highly improbably and lovely twist at the end. I met a man named Hussein who lives in Virginia. He came to the U.S. at the start of this year, so he's still adjusting to life here. The other day he asked me what daylight savings was, and I had a surprisingly hard time trying to explain it. Hussein is a really smart man, tall, very thin and attractive. He has a very calm and peaceful demeanor about him, so much so that you'd never guess the struggles he's had to overcome.

In 1990, the situation in Somalia deteriorated dramatically, and Hussein began working for the U.N. as an interpreter. The UNISOM mission moved in and didnt leave until 1995. He worked closely with a Malaysian UN commander and the two developed a close friendship. Before the UN pulled out (having failed to create peace) the commander encouraged Hussein to leave Somalia for Djibouti, and promised that his brother-in-law at the Malaysian Embassy in Djibouti would give him a visa to Malaysia. The Commander even hand wrote a letter in the Malaysian language and encouraged Hussein to give that letter to his brother-in-law, just to ensure confidence.

Hussein was unsure whether he wanted to make the journey to Djibouti so he just held on the the visa recommendation letter. When the U.N. completely pulled out of Somalia, Hussain was jobless and struggled to make ends meet. That's when he spoke with his family and told them he was going to make the trek to Djibouti and would hopefully reach Malaysia to find work. With their blessing, he traveled alone into Ethiopia and through to Djbouti. All he had on him was a few changes of clothing, $600 and the letter for the Malaysian embassy. In Djibouti, he spent nearly a hundred dollars on his first day just on food and a hotel room. He was down to $500. The next morning he rushed to the Malaysian embassy to seek the visa. After being turned away, he complained and eventually managed to get in and see the Commander's brother-in-law. The man said Hussein could get a visa, but that it would take three months and cost $400 dollars.

This was a huge blow to Hussein. He couldn't afford to wait three months especially since the cost of living in the city was so high. To top it all off, the Djiboutians- although they are ethnically Somali- were hostile to mainland Somalis, so he didn't expect to find a job. He spent that day and night thinking about whether he could wait, asking around for jobs, and thinking about how he could pay for all the costs associated with this prized visa. After drawing the conclusion that he couldn't stay, he got rid of his hopes of moving to Malaysia and caught the first bus out of town. He traveled through Ethiopia to its border with Somalia and Kenya. En route to the town, he slept on a train, using his only travel bag as a pillow. When he woke up at his destination, he discovered he had the bag stolen from right under him. And so he lost all his belongings except the cash he had strapped to his body. By this point he had $300 on him, and said he felt more alone and vulnerable than ever.

(See part 2)

Psychology in War

I was speaking with a recent refugee from Somalia today. Its so facinating when I speak with new refugees because I sense that I immediately give them full credibility over all things Somalia related, an unwise tendency of mine. Everyone (including myself) who looks at the situation from the outside doesnt get it, we're just working with secondhand information and a lot of guesswork. But the new refugees, now they surely understand the situation best. Of course this is not always the case, but I still love asking questions about what life is like in Somalia today whenever I meet someone who recently left the country.

 

Today I met a woman who left Somalia three years ago, and my conversation with her was so facinating. She had a scary way of describing the mental condition of Somalis today. She said that in 1990 just as the war broke out, the people were afraid and struggled to make a living. When things did not get better and conflict spread in the mid ninety's, there was a lot of mental disorders taking hold, people unable to cope with the drastic change in their surroundings and the instability.

Today, however, she says people are so used to the violence "you can even find people who don't look twice when they see a dead body, its become a normal thing." She said this so matter-of-factly that it made it all the more scary.

Her tragic description makes me want to look into the psychological impacts of this war more deeply. I'm wondering what type of government or leader can take hold of power in an environment so prone to conflict, and a population so used to it. What are the psychological factors that governance needs to take into account?

From bad to worse

Tragic news out of Somalia:

" A suicide bombing in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, left at least 32 people dead. Six of the victims were members or the embattled Somali parliament, and the government blamed the Al Qaeda-linked insurgent group, Al Shabab." -CSM

Just when it looked like things couldn't get worse in Somalia, they did. What will be the fallout of this deadly bombing is yet unclear, but what is clear is that things cannot continue on the current course. From the vantage point of residents of Mogadishu, the city is under siege. No progress has been made on minimizing the threat of Al-Shabab, or in creating a legitimate central government. The current strategy of the TFG and its outside allies must change.

At this point what is essential is a Somali-led process, one that is not interfered in (visibly) by outside actors/governments. Propping up "friendly" governments has not been a successful strategy, probably because, as it turns out, governments need at least a minimum threshold of popular support before they can function effectively. And the only way to defeat Al-Shabab is to provide a better option for the public, not a better option for foreign governments.

I'm nevertheless confident that things will get better in Somalia very soon. And so, as Somalis look for a relatively popular government to fill the current leadership vacuum, I'm hoping the international community will learn from the mistakes of the past and avoid backing unpopular leaders that prove unable to govern, but rather, take a step back and let Somalis resolve this issue internally.

AID

There is a lot of debate lately on the effectiveness of foreign aid. There are extremes in this debate, both of which make sense to a degree, which tells me that the answer is somewhere in the middle. There is the Jeffrey Sachs school that says aid is essential to lifting countries and populations out of poverty because it saves lives and fosters growth. And there is the increasingly popular view of Dambisa Moyo, that says that aid is detrimental to countries because it isn't sustainable and leads to unaccountable governance.

Two of my favorite economists seem to think aid is not desirable for development: Paul Colliers and William Easterly. The more I read about the issue, the more I think that the effectiveness of aid depends primarily on the quality of the government and institutions. Whether a nation can take aid money and make good use of it, or whether politicians pocket it and/or use it to consolidate their rule, depends on the leaders themselves. In places like Rwanda, the government is able to take advantage of foreign aid to develop infrastructure and strengthen institutions. This can be seen as a success story, howeveer, the government of Paul Kagame has recently been accused of attacking his opposition, and perhaps aid has made this targeting more possible.

Aid may be an enemy of democracy because it can so easily be used by governments to prop themselves up. But aid can also be a friend of democracy by enabling weak governments to carry out the sorts of reforms and development plans necessary to create strong governance. So ultimately, as long as aid is given to governments and organizations without their being held accountable for progress, the impact of aid will be weak and unclear at best.

Somalia's war as a bargaining failure needing a peace-broker

I firmly believe war is not the natural state of humans, but that war is a consequence of a bargaining failure between states or parties. In Somalia, there were many attempts at resolving the conflict before the 1990 civil war started but they all failed. Lack of understanding about the other side's capabilities, intent and capacity made it difficult for the clan leaders to agree on a settlement. After an agreement between the conflicting parties fell apart in 1992, the U.S. military entered Somalia, primarily to ensure aid convoys reached intended populations, but they also represented a guarantor for a new agreement in the eyes of Somali warlords. The next agreement reached outlasted all of the others because it had a credible commitment in the U.S. military presence.

When the U.S.’s UNITAF force withdrew and was replaced by the U.N.’s UNISOM II, the credibility of the force diminished (in the eyes of the warlords) because of the perceived weakness of the U.N. Further complicating matters, the U.N. adopted a strategy of siding with one warlord and targeting the other, leading to frequent firefights and the disastrous battle of Mogadishu.

A Credible Peace-broker

This example from recent history can be a valuable lesson as we think about whether a military force can be effective in Somalia today. The make-up of the force, as well as its mission on the ground, determine whether it can play the role of a guarantor of a peace agreement, or whether it will simply become a party to the conflict.

In 1992, the U.S. was the most credible guarantor of peace because of its military might and its neutrality among the warring factions. Today, however, the U.S. cannot play that role. The disastrous consequences following the Ethiopian occupation reveal that Ethiopia cannot play such a role. And it appears Uganda, too, can no longer play a neutral role now that it has been engaged in combat in Mogadishu for so long. 

The question many policymakers are wondering is who, if anyone, can play the role of peace broker in Somalia? That’s a difficult question to answer until there is more clarity about the ambitions of Al-Shabab, and whether they would see any party as an acceptable force. There needs to be a better grasp on how the objectives of the organization are shaped and change, and where the zone of possible agreement lies between the TFG and al-Shabab. Until then, we will continue to attempt to create resolutions that end in just another bargaining failure.

Economics of war

I spoke with an economics professor a while ago. He was completely unfamiliar with the situation in Somalia so I gave him a summary of what is going on. He then suggested I look into how economics can explain the continuation of conflict in Somalia. To sum up his idea, he stated that logically Somalia should be stable by now, and the fact that it is not suggest key stakeholders are benefiting from the instability. He described the struggle for power between the TFG, Shabaab and other entities as a struggle to provide economic goods to the population. The primary good they attempt to offer is security.

This analysis was very interesting, but I immediately thought of a weakness in the argument. If the parties are attempting to provide a good- primarily security- and the population is the consumer being targeted, then why doesn't the population have more of a role in the developments on the ground than they currently do? Similar to the power of consumers in determining the actions of producers through the laws of supply and demand. It seems more like the goods of each faction are forced on the population that falls within their sphere of influence, and some groups even do more to decrease security than increase it. The people, particularly in Mogadishu, have little power to determine which entity they live under.

I think the economic analysis is a very valuable one, particularly when considering why other nations and entities are involved in Somali affairs, but economics certainly cannot explain everything. The situation in Somalia cannot be assessed through one lens; economic, political or otherwise. It has very much to do with political leaders, businesses, ideas, historical experience, international developments and timing, among other things. The re-stabilization of Somalia will require a more beneficial confluence of these and other factors.

Recommendations for Peacekeeping missions

As nations become more interconnected and come into greater contact, conflicts are increasingly boiling over, from narco-terrorism to piracy, leading internal conflicts to spread instability to other nations and continents. Thus, preventing conflicts and maintaining stability- depending on the region- can be a hugely important role for multi-national organizations. The United Nations and other multinational organizations such as the AU have peacekeeping mechanisms, but face major challenges in exerting influence. Peacekeeping has proved unsuccessful in many cases, including Somalia, because of weaknesses in the peacekeeping operations, including the lack of clarity on when to intervene, how to intervene (strategy), and the difficulty in finding resources for missions. These challenges, I believe, can be alleviated through more operational efficiency; however, they cannot be completely eliminated because they are inherent to the nature of peacekeeping, given the nature of anarchic international politics and global governance structures.

 

Recommendations

• Peacekeepers should only go into a situation where there is a peace to keep
• A criteria should be developed to elaborate on how engagement should occur, based on consent and impartiality
• Nation building and peace enforcement should not be the function of multinational peacekeeping operations
• Mandates should be limited in scope and resourced appropriately
• The peacekeeping strategy used should be context specific, local knowledge is necessary
• A clear command and control structure should be established for contingents
•  Resources should be more effectively acquired through institutional re-structuring to increase the incentives to support missions
• Rapid peacekeeping troop deployment mechanisms should be established