A new cabinet, a new hope?

Somalia now has a new and largely diaspora cabinet, with 7 Americans, including the prime minister. This is exciting for a lot of people because it represents a departure from business as usual. The same corrupt faces who have made a living off of Somali politics have been deprived- at least in name- of the powers associated with being ministers. Of course that still leaves the bloated parliament with its many unsavory characters in the mix. Whether the current transitional federal government accomplishes anything in the next eight months, which is the duration of their mandate, depends partly on whether parliament will cooperate- unlikely- and whether the international community will provide them with the necessary support- also unlikely. The bright spot in all of this is that hopefully more diaspora and non-diaspora Somalis who have not made careers off of politicking will feel more comfortable stepping forward with new ideas. Because if anything is clear regarding the Somalia debacle, its that fresh ideas and fresh faces are desperately needed.

A uniquely Somali love story- Part 2

After weeks of traveling and having his bag stolen from right under him as he slept, Hussein decided to stop for a few days in a border town where Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya meet. The town was bustling with commerce and trade between the neighboring nations, and he was able to find work with a local export company. The pay was not significant enough for him to consider settling, and so in a few months he was on a bus heading down to Nairobi.

As Hussein recounted his story to me, I noticed a sudden change in his tone and emotion when he described the arrival in Kenya- as if this was the part of the story he was waiting to get to. As if the earlier parts of his story were long, painful and tedious, and he'd rather not dwell on it.

With newfound excitement, he described his arrival in Eastleigh, the Somali district in Nairobi, as a joyous sort of homecoming. Many of his friends and family had settled there, and so after months of lonely and unpredictable travel, he suddenly had the warmth and hospitality of those he knew and loved. Just moments after getting off the bus in Eastleigh, he ran into two friends from his childhood in Somalia. They immediately offered to host him until he located relatives and other friends. Suddenly, for the first time in months, he had a warm bed to sleep on and did not have to worry about whether he could afford to stay another night. Shortly after arriving in Eastleigh, Hussein was offered a job at a friends store. Hussein created a life for himself in Eastleigh, eventually finding a better job as an english teacher in a secondary school; a job that gave him room and board.

Two years later, on what was seemingly a typical day, a friend of Hussein's told him he heard that someone he might know what in town. "Who?" Hussein asked, not expecting what he was about to hear. The friend told him Hawa, Husseins old high school sweetheart from his hometown in somalia, was in Nairobi. Hawa and Hussein were once in love and speaking of marriage and a family when the civil war suddenly erupted, pushing them to different corners of the globe. That afternoon Hussein discovered that Hawa had gone to the United States and began working as a nurse. Hussein was proud of her for escaping the difficulties back home, but he also felt saddened to think that surely, after so long, she is already married. Even he had been briefly married until the suddent and tragic death of his young wife. 

The friend offered to call Hawa and set up a chance for the two to meet. To Husseins surprise, she agreed and the two planned to meet downtown to "catch up" on life. As Hussein describes it, it wasnt long into their conversation when they both mentioned they were single, and something clearly clicked for the two. They had a mutual feeling that this was meant to be, and that the unlikely chance of finding each other, during her brief visit to Nairobi, actually occurred.

The rest, as they say, is history. They had a huge wedding celebration in Nairobi, moved to the U.S., and the two recently had their first child, a baby girl.

A uniquely Somali love story - Part 1

The life stories of Somali refugees are the most complicated, tragic, but hopeful stories you'll ever come across. I've heard Somalis describe just about every route possible in their journey to the U.S., and the risk and ingenuity involved is astounding. I've never come across a Somali family that didn't have stops in at least one or two countries, some stopping in as many as four or five nations, before reaching their destination in the U.S. or elsewhere.

But today I heard a story unlike the others in that it was one that had a highly improbably and lovely twist at the end. I met a man named Hussein who lives in Virginia. He came to the U.S. at the start of this year, so he's still adjusting to life here. The other day he asked me what daylight savings was, and I had a surprisingly hard time trying to explain it. Hussein is a really smart man, tall, very thin and attractive. He has a very calm and peaceful demeanor about him, so much so that you'd never guess the struggles he's had to overcome.

In 1990, the situation in Somalia deteriorated dramatically, and Hussein began working for the U.N. as an interpreter. The UNISOM mission moved in and didnt leave until 1995. He worked closely with a Malaysian UN commander and the two developed a close friendship. Before the UN pulled out (having failed to create peace) the commander encouraged Hussein to leave Somalia for Djibouti, and promised that his brother-in-law at the Malaysian Embassy in Djibouti would give him a visa to Malaysia. The Commander even hand wrote a letter in the Malaysian language and encouraged Hussein to give that letter to his brother-in-law, just to ensure confidence.

Hussein was unsure whether he wanted to make the journey to Djibouti so he just held on the the visa recommendation letter. When the U.N. completely pulled out of Somalia, Hussain was jobless and struggled to make ends meet. That's when he spoke with his family and told them he was going to make the trek to Djibouti and would hopefully reach Malaysia to find work. With their blessing, he traveled alone into Ethiopia and through to Djbouti. All he had on him was a few changes of clothing, $600 and the letter for the Malaysian embassy. In Djibouti, he spent nearly a hundred dollars on his first day just on food and a hotel room. He was down to $500. The next morning he rushed to the Malaysian embassy to seek the visa. After being turned away, he complained and eventually managed to get in and see the Commander's brother-in-law. The man said Hussein could get a visa, but that it would take three months and cost $400 dollars.

This was a huge blow to Hussein. He couldn't afford to wait three months especially since the cost of living in the city was so high. To top it all off, the Djiboutians- although they are ethnically Somali- were hostile to mainland Somalis, so he didn't expect to find a job. He spent that day and night thinking about whether he could wait, asking around for jobs, and thinking about how he could pay for all the costs associated with this prized visa. After drawing the conclusion that he couldn't stay, he got rid of his hopes of moving to Malaysia and caught the first bus out of town. He traveled through Ethiopia to its border with Somalia and Kenya. En route to the town, he slept on a train, using his only travel bag as a pillow. When he woke up at his destination, he discovered he had the bag stolen from right under him. And so he lost all his belongings except the cash he had strapped to his body. By this point he had $300 on him, and said he felt more alone and vulnerable than ever.

(See part 2)

Psychology in War

I was speaking with a recent refugee from Somalia today. Its so facinating when I speak with new refugees because I sense that I immediately give them full credibility over all things Somalia related, an unwise tendency of mine. Everyone (including myself) who looks at the situation from the outside doesnt get it, we're just working with secondhand information and a lot of guesswork. But the new refugees, now they surely understand the situation best. Of course this is not always the case, but I still love asking questions about what life is like in Somalia today whenever I meet someone who recently left the country.

 

Today I met a woman who left Somalia three years ago, and my conversation with her was so facinating. She had a scary way of describing the mental condition of Somalis today. She said that in 1990 just as the war broke out, the people were afraid and struggled to make a living. When things did not get better and conflict spread in the mid ninety's, there was a lot of mental disorders taking hold, people unable to cope with the drastic change in their surroundings and the instability.

Today, however, she says people are so used to the violence "you can even find people who don't look twice when they see a dead body, its become a normal thing." She said this so matter-of-factly that it made it all the more scary.

Her tragic description makes me want to look into the psychological impacts of this war more deeply. I'm wondering what type of government or leader can take hold of power in an environment so prone to conflict, and a population so used to it. What are the psychological factors that governance needs to take into account?

From bad to worse

Tragic news out of Somalia:

" A suicide bombing in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, left at least 32 people dead. Six of the victims were members or the embattled Somali parliament, and the government blamed the Al Qaeda-linked insurgent group, Al Shabab." -CSM

Just when it looked like things couldn't get worse in Somalia, they did. What will be the fallout of this deadly bombing is yet unclear, but what is clear is that things cannot continue on the current course. From the vantage point of residents of Mogadishu, the city is under siege. No progress has been made on minimizing the threat of Al-Shabab, or in creating a legitimate central government. The current strategy of the TFG and its outside allies must change.

At this point what is essential is a Somali-led process, one that is not interfered in (visibly) by outside actors/governments. Propping up "friendly" governments has not been a successful strategy, probably because, as it turns out, governments need at least a minimum threshold of popular support before they can function effectively. And the only way to defeat Al-Shabab is to provide a better option for the public, not a better option for foreign governments.

I'm nevertheless confident that things will get better in Somalia very soon. And so, as Somalis look for a relatively popular government to fill the current leadership vacuum, I'm hoping the international community will learn from the mistakes of the past and avoid backing unpopular leaders that prove unable to govern, but rather, take a step back and let Somalis resolve this issue internally.

AID

There is a lot of debate lately on the effectiveness of foreign aid. There are extremes in this debate, both of which make sense to a degree, which tells me that the answer is somewhere in the middle. There is the Jeffrey Sachs school that says aid is essential to lifting countries and populations out of poverty because it saves lives and fosters growth. And there is the increasingly popular view of Dambisa Moyo, that says that aid is detrimental to countries because it isn't sustainable and leads to unaccountable governance.

Two of my favorite economists seem to think aid is not desirable for development: Paul Colliers and William Easterly. The more I read about the issue, the more I think that the effectiveness of aid depends primarily on the quality of the government and institutions. Whether a nation can take aid money and make good use of it, or whether politicians pocket it and/or use it to consolidate their rule, depends on the leaders themselves. In places like Rwanda, the government is able to take advantage of foreign aid to develop infrastructure and strengthen institutions. This can be seen as a success story, howeveer, the government of Paul Kagame has recently been accused of attacking his opposition, and perhaps aid has made this targeting more possible.

Aid may be an enemy of democracy because it can so easily be used by governments to prop themselves up. But aid can also be a friend of democracy by enabling weak governments to carry out the sorts of reforms and development plans necessary to create strong governance. So ultimately, as long as aid is given to governments and organizations without their being held accountable for progress, the impact of aid will be weak and unclear at best.

Somalia's war as a bargaining failure needing a peace-broker

I firmly believe war is not the natural state of humans, but that war is a consequence of a bargaining failure between states or parties. In Somalia, there were many attempts at resolving the conflict before the 1990 civil war started but they all failed. Lack of understanding about the other side's capabilities, intent and capacity made it difficult for the clan leaders to agree on a settlement. After an agreement between the conflicting parties fell apart in 1992, the U.S. military entered Somalia, primarily to ensure aid convoys reached intended populations, but they also represented a guarantor for a new agreement in the eyes of Somali warlords. The next agreement reached outlasted all of the others because it had a credible commitment in the U.S. military presence.

When the U.S.’s UNITAF force withdrew and was replaced by the U.N.’s UNISOM II, the credibility of the force diminished (in the eyes of the warlords) because of the perceived weakness of the U.N. Further complicating matters, the U.N. adopted a strategy of siding with one warlord and targeting the other, leading to frequent firefights and the disastrous battle of Mogadishu.

A Credible Peace-broker

This example from recent history can be a valuable lesson as we think about whether a military force can be effective in Somalia today. The make-up of the force, as well as its mission on the ground, determine whether it can play the role of a guarantor of a peace agreement, or whether it will simply become a party to the conflict.

In 1992, the U.S. was the most credible guarantor of peace because of its military might and its neutrality among the warring factions. Today, however, the U.S. cannot play that role. The disastrous consequences following the Ethiopian occupation reveal that Ethiopia cannot play such a role. And it appears Uganda, too, can no longer play a neutral role now that it has been engaged in combat in Mogadishu for so long. 

The question many policymakers are wondering is who, if anyone, can play the role of peace broker in Somalia? That’s a difficult question to answer until there is more clarity about the ambitions of Al-Shabab, and whether they would see any party as an acceptable force. There needs to be a better grasp on how the objectives of the organization are shaped and change, and where the zone of possible agreement lies between the TFG and al-Shabab. Until then, we will continue to attempt to create resolutions that end in just another bargaining failure.

Economics of war

I spoke with an economics professor a while ago. He was completely unfamiliar with the situation in Somalia so I gave him a summary of what is going on. He then suggested I look into how economics can explain the continuation of conflict in Somalia. To sum up his idea, he stated that logically Somalia should be stable by now, and the fact that it is not suggest key stakeholders are benefiting from the instability. He described the struggle for power between the TFG, Shabaab and other entities as a struggle to provide economic goods to the population. The primary good they attempt to offer is security.

This analysis was very interesting, but I immediately thought of a weakness in the argument. If the parties are attempting to provide a good- primarily security- and the population is the consumer being targeted, then why doesn't the population have more of a role in the developments on the ground than they currently do? Similar to the power of consumers in determining the actions of producers through the laws of supply and demand. It seems more like the goods of each faction are forced on the population that falls within their sphere of influence, and some groups even do more to decrease security than increase it. The people, particularly in Mogadishu, have little power to determine which entity they live under.

I think the economic analysis is a very valuable one, particularly when considering why other nations and entities are involved in Somali affairs, but economics certainly cannot explain everything. The situation in Somalia cannot be assessed through one lens; economic, political or otherwise. It has very much to do with political leaders, businesses, ideas, historical experience, international developments and timing, among other things. The re-stabilization of Somalia will require a more beneficial confluence of these and other factors.

Recommendations for Peacekeeping missions

As nations become more interconnected and come into greater contact, conflicts are increasingly boiling over, from narco-terrorism to piracy, leading internal conflicts to spread instability to other nations and continents. Thus, preventing conflicts and maintaining stability- depending on the region- can be a hugely important role for multi-national organizations. The United Nations and other multinational organizations such as the AU have peacekeeping mechanisms, but face major challenges in exerting influence. Peacekeeping has proved unsuccessful in many cases, including Somalia, because of weaknesses in the peacekeeping operations, including the lack of clarity on when to intervene, how to intervene (strategy), and the difficulty in finding resources for missions. These challenges, I believe, can be alleviated through more operational efficiency; however, they cannot be completely eliminated because they are inherent to the nature of peacekeeping, given the nature of anarchic international politics and global governance structures.

 

Recommendations

• Peacekeepers should only go into a situation where there is a peace to keep
• A criteria should be developed to elaborate on how engagement should occur, based on consent and impartiality
• Nation building and peace enforcement should not be the function of multinational peacekeeping operations
• Mandates should be limited in scope and resourced appropriately
• The peacekeeping strategy used should be context specific, local knowledge is necessary
• A clear command and control structure should be established for contingents
•  Resources should be more effectively acquired through institutional re-structuring to increase the incentives to support missions
• Rapid peacekeeping troop deployment mechanisms should be established

Colliers on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

A friend of mine just told me about Ted.com, a brilliant website that has short video's done by leading intellectuals and leaders from all fields, talking about a valuable idea they wish to share with the world. I just listed to Paul Collier's video called "New Rules on Building Post-conflict Nations." I personally found it very valuable. Some of his ideas are not new but he did mention some novel ways of approaching post-conflict reconstruction.

http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/paul_collier_s_new_rules_for_rebuilding_a_broken_nation.html

Summary of Collier's Ideas on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

His main point is that post-conflict reconstruction approaches are usually based on political approaches, and this has proven to be a failed strategy. Forced political settlements, short-lived peacekeeping deployments and premature elections usually do not create stable, legitimate government. He argues that the game of politics must be changed from a zero-sum game to a positive-sum game, and this can be done by first creating security and then building prosperity.

He says three interdependent actors play key-role in post-conflict countries: the Security Council because they control peacekeeping troops, donors because they provide aid and assist in economic recovery and the post-conflict Government because it has the power to do economic reform and be politically inclusive.

These three actors are interdependent because if the Security Council doesn’t commit to recreating security, there won’t be the environment for investment to occur. Without policy reform and aid, economic recovery cannot happen. Collier called for a Compact of some sort to bring together the three actors to make mutual commitments.
He also identified three critical steps in post-conflict reconstruction:

Jobs

Young men especially need jobs to prevent militancy. Most governments expand civil service and have bloated bureaucracies because uncompetitive economics makes private sector expansion difficult. Collier recommends these governments focus on the construction sector because construction isn’t exposed to international trade and can generate jobs fast. The post-conflict government’s policy priority should be to break bottlenecks in the construction sector by enabling legal land acquisition, skill-building, and increasing firms.

Improvement in Services

This is important because populations must see the post-conflict government providing for them, and collaboration with NGOs is a wise way to provide these services. Government ministries can plan policies and distribute finances to NGOs that provide necessary services on. This will allow NGOs to compete with each other, and the government can put its name on services that reach the population.

Clean Government
The typical post-conflict government doesn’t have money even for basic requirements. If donors just put money in and leave, that money can easily be wasted or captured by corrupt politicians. Scrutiny and technical assistance should come with finances. On a broader not, politicians shouldn’t have much money otherwise the wrong type of people are attracted to the job.

Why Somalia is a failed state

I got an e-mail the other day advertising an event titled "Why States Fail." I immediately thought maybe, just maybe, this lecture could give me some insight on the case of Somalia. In the end, it actually did clarify a few things- sort of. It's expalantion was a theory based on political economies.

The lecturer was Daron Acemoglu from MIT. His thesis is that states fail when they do not have inclusive political and economic instititutions. Hence, to prevent states from failing, make sure these institutions are strong and inclusive, rather than extractive.

Inclusive institution allow for a more level playing field, rule of law and a broader coaltition of leaders, while extractive institutions have barriers to economic and political advancement for most of the population, except for the few that extract their money and power from the rest.

When a state has inclusive institutions, according to Acemoglu, a sufficient amount of the population has their interests met, and feel as though there is space for them in the current system to improve their condition, either financially or politically. Further, there is room for growth and development when institutions are inclusive because it enables the reallocation of benefits and creative destruction- changing those institutions or practices that are no longer moving the nation forward. When institutions are extractive, the amount of freedom to allow for creative destruction no longer exists, and nations are stagnant wherever the elite believe they can benefit and extract the most from the population. Inclusive institutions are therefore more favorable to growth and development.

How does this apply to Somalia?

Somalia, with its zero-sum political climate, certainly doesnt have inclusive political institutions. According to Acemoglu, however, nations that adopt inclusive economic institutions will more likely move in the direction of inclusive political instutions as more of the population is financially empowered. There are many factors that are invovled in this transition, and Acemoglu says a "lucky confluence of factors" must occur to enable nations to make such a transformative transition. I'd sure like to hear more about what that confluence entails.

Somalia has one of the worlds most open markets, and is therefore largely economically inclusive. The problem, however, is that there is insufficient rule of law and property rights that would enable more effective economic institutions and growth. Nevertheless, this research suggests that if the transitional Somali government increases the robustness of the already largely inclusive economic institutions, then the inclusive political instutions will more likely follow.

I'm not sure of the predictive power of this theory, but it certainly is a strategy the Somali government should look into as a means of stabilizing the country and enabling development in the long-term.

Somalia and DR Congo

I just attended a highly informative talk today on the DR Congo. I walked away feeling angered by the situation in the DRC, and really hoping the Congolese people would mobilize to force change and claim peace.

What struck me was the similarities between the conflicts in Somalia and the DRC:

1- Both DRC and Somalia are considered failed states. Their central governments are largely seen as illegitimate and incapable of governing effectively.

2- Both countries were colonized by Europeans, although the genocide of King Leopolds Congo "Free" State was surely more devastating than the random assortment of Somali colonizers.

3- Both nations had nationalist post-independent leaders who were soon after replaced by dictators (Mobutu and Barre). After decades in power, these dictators were overthrown by popular uprising.

4- Both populations now feel the dictators weren't so bad after all, considering the chaos that has resulted.

5- Both nations are rich in natural resources (Somalia's have yet to be really exploited).

6- Neighboring nations and the international community play a heavy role in the conflicts, and their differing agendas exacerbate tensions.

7- The discourse about how to resolve the troubles in these countries always involves a role for outside actors, when in fact it will take the people themselves to advocate on their own behalf, and bring about positive change.

God bless both countries, the people have suffered long enough.

Do humans deserve to Starve for living near Bad guys?

The U.S. reduced its funding to Somalia last year [2009] after its Office of Foreign Assets Control expressed fear that the extended supply line and insurgent-heavy areas where aid agencies were operating meant aid could be diverted to a group with links to al-Qaida. Associated Press


In response to this step by the U.S., the WFP has dramatically downsized its food distribution in some regions of Somalia- regions holding some of the most at-risk and vulnerable populations in the nation.  


This situation is outrageous. How can food aid be denied to a population in desperate need, simply because the aid "could be diverted" to groups with alleged links to al-Qaida? Since we could be feeding a few enemies, we should therefore stop delivering food and leave the entire populations of those regions to suffer. I respect Obama tremendously but this is one of the most unethical decisions taken by his administration, and I'd urge his government and all others to lobby to overturn this tragically misguided policy. 

What Kind of Leader Does Somalia Need

Joseph Nye describes in his book The Powers to Lead that there are two kinds of leaders; transformational and transactional. A transformational leader has the ability to unite divided groups with a shared goal and transform the direction and condition of a nation. Transactional leaders unite populations gradually through existing institutions and checks. There can be a combination of transactional style with transformational objectives and vice versa. Why am I mentioning this on a blog about Somalia?

Somalia needs a Transformational Leader


The nation needs a transformational leader who can show the Somali people- who have suffered for far too long- that they CAN move forward, CAN live in a peaceful nation and CAN have stable and productive lives. What is needed is a leader to inspire trust and rally followers towards an objective of rebuilding Somalia to the beautiful, safe and prosperous nation it ought to be. A leader who moves beyond narrow divisions of clan or ideology, and shows Somalis that they have so much in common that makes them great. A leader that is willing to sacrifice and work tirelessly for the ultimate goal of guiding his or her people towards positive change. The leader cannot just preach this vision, but must educate the population so that they believe in it and develop a broader sense of identity and shared goals. The transactional style of warlords and the current government cannot work. The institutions simply aren’t in place to allow for transactional changes, and the longer the nation waits the more generations will be lost.

Machiavelli once wrote that its important for leaders to seem to be moral. I think there is some value in Machiavelli’s writings but this one I disagree with completely. Certainly in the case of Somalia, it is necessary to move beyond a leader who seems to be moral, and seems to care about the needs and aspirations of the people. Somalia- first and foremost- needs a leader who is deeply moral, and cares sincerely about rebuilding the nation and helping the population. Lastly, this leader must truly understand and empathize with the needs of the Somali people, and cannot be an opportunist, divisive figure or disconnected Diaspora member.

That is what is needed today but unfortunately there doesn’t appear to be anyone who fits the bill rising from amongst the Somali people. There must be a Somali Barack Obama or Nelson Mandela- I refuse to believe there are none.